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I.

ABSTRACT

The World War I (WWI) era generated the substantive First
Amendment. Subsequent jurisprudence, however, has focused on
the speech right and left the right to assemble underdeveloped. This
is so because courts, lawyers, and scholars view the WWI cases as
speech cases. In fact, these cases implicitly tested the assembly
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law.
Many thanks go to Ashutosh Bhagwat, R. Michael Cassidy, Ronald K.L. Collins,
Stephen M. Feldman, Gregory M. Gilchrist, Jonathan Hafetz, Paul Horwitz,
John D. Inazu, Helen Norton, and Alexander Tsesis for their invaluable
comments on earlier drafts, and to Erwin Chemerinsky for guidance on sources.
Thanks also to Annique M. Lockard for excellent editing and comments. This
article could not have been possible without the support of Dean Kathryn R.L.
Rand, of the University of North Dakota School of Law. All errors are my own.
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right more than they have been read to test the speech right because
they involved “membership crime” – criminal conspiracy in federal
and state courts, and criminal syndicalism at the state level. This
Article uncovers the importance of the assembly right during the
substantive First Amendment’s generation. It therefore serves as a
corrective to the law’s lopsided focus on the speech right, and
ultimately argues for the importance of assembly in democracybased arguments for robust First Amendment rights.

II. INTRODUCTION
The World War I era generated the substantive First
Amendment. Three 1919 cases – Schenck v. United States, 1
Frohwerk v. United States, 2 and Abrams v. United States 3 – are
celebrated for introducing the clear and present danger test for
speech rights. 4 But these cases and the broader system of federal
and state case law from 1918 through 1925 implicitly tested the
First Amendment’s assembly right more than courts, lawyers, and
scholars have read them to test the speech right. This is so because
they all involved what I call “membership crime” – criminal
conspiracy in federal and state courts, and criminal syndicalism at
the state level.
The result has been subsequent jurisprudence that favors the
speech right while leaving the assembly right underdeveloped. 5
This is a problem for historical, doctrinal, and democratic reasons.
Historically, the development of First Amendment jurisprudence
has been shaped by an incomplete history of the WWI era.
Doctrinally, the law is distorted because it favors speech while
virtually ignoring assembly. Democratically, assembly is necessary
1. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
2. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
3. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
4. A fourth case, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), is sometimes
connected to this trio. But that case did not mention the clear and present
danger test and, unlike the trio, was not, strictly speaking, a membership crime
case.
5. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Liberty’s Forgotten Refugees? Engendering
Assembly, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1423 (2012); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Assembly
Resurrected, __ TEX. L. REV. __, 1 (forthcoming 2015); Ashutosh Bhagwat,
Associations and Forums: Situating CLS v. Martinez, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
543, 550 (2011); Tabitha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA
L. REV. 543 (2009); Richard A. Epstein, Forgotten No More. A Review of Liberty’s
Refuge: The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly by John D. Inazu, 13 ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 138 (2012); PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST
AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013); JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE
FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012); Michael W. McConnell, Reflections
on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821 (2012); Frederick Schauer,
Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005);
Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Rethinking the Value of
Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949 (2004).
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because it has been individuals combining into groups that have
driven social change. Focusing on speech rights rather than
assembly emboldens soapbox orators, but inhibits democratic
participation.
This Article seeks to ameliorate the speech–assembly
imbalance by uncovering a set of case law much broader than the
1919 trio that reveals the importance of assembly, and the fact that
WWI-era prosecutions primarily targeted that right, not speech.
To do so, this Article proceeds in eight parts. In Part II, it
discusses the Alien and Sedition Acts, suggesting that membership
crime’s impact on First Amendment principles existed at the
framing of the Constitution. In Part III, it describes the forty-year
history leading up to World War I and the United States’
concomitant repression of dissident groups. In Part IV, it introduces
the censorship and government violence that were imposed upon
dissident groups during World War I. In Part V, it discusses the
First Amendment’s substantive advent in the three 1919 cases. In
Part VI, it describes the early conspiracy cases, which presaged the
Red Scare, described in Part VII. In Part VIII, it discusses the state
syndicalism cases after the start of the Red Scare. In Part IX, it
notes the winding down of the Red Scare and the return to relative
normalcy.

III. THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS
Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798. At this
time, Congress was composed of many of the Constitution’s drafters
and ratifiers, so these Acts imply the First Amendment’s originalist
definition. The Acts permitted the federal government to detain 6
and deport 7 aliens deemed by the President to be dangerous to the
United States. They also imposed criminal liability for advising or
attempting to combine with others or actually combining with
others to oppose any governmental measure. 8
The framers of the First Amendment therefore appeared to
favor police power primacy over individual constitutional rights, 9
6. Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 21
(2014)) (stating that during wartime, the Acts permitted the government to
“apprehend[], restrain[], secure[] and remove[], as alien enemies . . . all [male,
adult] natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or
government”).
7. Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 571 (1798).
8. An Act in addition to the Alien Act, entitled Act for the Punishment of
Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
9. See Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The Progressive Expansion of
State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 POL. RES.
Q. 623, 632 (1994) (explaining that the key question in the 19th century was
“not whether laws interfered with preferred freedoms but rather whether laws
affecting liberty or property nevertheless promoted ‘the general good of the
whole’”).

732

The John Marshall Law Review

[48:729

leaving little room for substantive speech or assembly rights. 10
Congress created explicit and implicit membership crimes by
criminalizing not only anti-government combinations, but also by
criminalizing such a broad swath of substantive activity that any
association with such combinations could be the subject of criminal
prosecution.

IV.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: 1877–WORLD WAR I

Socio-political control of unpopular groups underlay both the
Alien and Sedition Acts and the use of common law criminal
conspiracy in the nineteenth century against labor unions.

A. Dangerous Times
Attempts to form national trade unions began in the 1850s 11
and quickly generated a number of such unions, 12 hundreds of
thousands of members, 13 and widespread 14 and massive strikes. 15
While most union activity was agitative but peaceful, potentially
violent elements did emerge. 16
Given the rise of militant labor 17 and pushback from capital
and the courts, violence seemed inevitable. In 1877 the largest
10. Id. at 637 (“Throughout this period the Court’s approach to the nature
and scope of legislative power was essentially categorical – laws either promoted
the public interest or they didn’t; it did not involve the modern method of
‘weighing’ or ‘balancing’ the strength of a particular right against the strength
of the government’s interest in infringing on the right.”).
11. Deborah A. Ballam, Commentary: The Law as a Constitutive Force for
Change: The Impact of the Judiciary on Labor Law History, 32 AM. BUS. L.J.
125, 129 (1994).
12. Id. at 130.
13. See DAVID RAY PAPKE, THE PULLMAN CASE: THE CLASH OF LABOR AND
CAPITAL IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 9 (1999) (noting that by 1886, the Knights of
Labor had 730,000 members).
14. Ballam, supra note 11, at 143.
15. JAMES GREEN, DEATH IN THE HAYMARKET: A STORY OF CHICAGO, THE
FIRST LABOR MOVEMENT AND THE BOMBING THAT DIVIDED GILDED AGE
AMERICA 145 (2006).
16. TIMOTHY MESSER-KRUSE, THE TRIAL OF THE HAYMARKET ANARCHISTS:
TERRORISM AND JUSTICE IN THE GILDED AGE 11–13 (2011). The International
Working People’s Association formed in 1883, which “rejected the political and
incremental methods of its socialist predecessors and instead pledged itself to
immediate revolutionary change by any means.” Id. at 11. Others in the labor
movement proposed “engaging in dramatic acts of violent resistance against
state authorities,” which included targeting religious institutions, government,
elections, courts, jails, bankers, policemen, and bosses as targets in a war of
class liberation. Id. at 12–13.
17. Ballam, supra note 11, at 130 (“[L]abor militancy was alive and well.”).
This was evidenced by a German workers’ militia, which in 1877 “could marshal
four companies with several divisions (each with forty men). Its officers
explained that the militiamen would act only if workers’ constitutional rights
were violated.” GREEN, supra note 15, at 86.
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strike up to that time in U.S. history 18 began with walkouts of
railroad crews, which was followed the next day by an armed clash
in West Virginia. 19 At the railroad’s request, the governor deployed
the state militia, which killed a locomotive fireman. 20 As news of
this spread, strikers garnered support from townspeople, farmers,
and two companies of the state militia. 21 President Hayes sent in
federal troops; around the country 20,000 troops were on riot duty
and between 200 and 400 people died. 22
Nine years later, a huge strike for the eight-hour workday
began at the McCormick Reaper Works in Chicago. 23 Two days
later, police charged a line of union members, killing two and
wounding others. 24 The next day, labor groups organized a rally at
Haymarket Square. 25 As police approached the protesters, someone
threw a bomb that killed one policeman and wounded others. 26
Police opened fire and some workers responded with gunfire of their
own. 27 Several people died and scores were injured. 28
The Haymarket bombing, and the resulting conspiracy trial of
anarchist August Spies and others, created fear and political
paranoia 29 and sparked the country’s first red scare. 30 Courts 31 and
the press 32 condemned all non-citizen labor agitators as criminals,
and it appeared that the country was in a new civil war. 33 Strikes,
walkouts, and boycotts were the weapons of labor, the criminality
of which courts struggled to determine. 34 Labor combinations,
18. Ballam, supra note 11, at 130.
19. ANTHONY WOODIWISS, RIGHTS V. CONSPIRACY: A SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAY
ON THE HISTORY OF LABOUR LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 74 (1990).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 75.
23. GREEN, supra note 15, at 3.
24. Id. at 5; PAPKE, supra note 13, at 16.
25. Id.; PAPKE, supra note 13, at 16.
26. PAPKE, supra note 13, at 16.
27. GREEN, supra note 15, at 5.
28. Donald J. Smythe, The Rise of the Corporation, the Birth of Public
Relations, and the Foundations of Modern Political Economy, 50 WASHBURN
L.J. 635, 648 (2011).
29. PAPKE, supra note 13, at 16.
30. MESSER-KRUSE, supra note 16, at 4.
31. VICTORIA C. HATTAM, LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER: THE ORIGINS
OF BUSINESS UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 70 (1993). One judge in 1886
accused non-citizen labor agitators of “socialistic crimes” that were “gross
breaches of national hospitality.” Id.
32. GREEN, supra note 15, at 8–9. The Chicago Tribune held “aliens”
responsible for the Haymarket deaths, calling on the government to deport the
“ungrateful hyenas” and exclude other “foreign savages who might come to
America with their dynamite bombs and anarchic purposes.” Id.
33. Edward de Grazia, The Haymarket Bomb, 18 LAW & LITERATURE 283
(2006).
34. See Herbert Wechsler, William Kenneth Jones, & Harold L. Korn, The
Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law
Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, Part Two, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
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however peaceful, were seen as an existential threat to the nation.

B. Fearful Times
Judicial opinions reflected this threat perception. 35 In 1887, for
example, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered the legality of
a conspiracy of workmen to boycott their company and distribute
flyers. 36 Affirming the conviction, the court wrote, “The exercise of
irresponsible power by men, like the taste of human blood by tigers,
creates an unappeasable appetite for more.” 37 If boycotts and
distribution of flyers were legal, said the court, “[t]he end would be
anarchy, pure and simple.” 38 Conspiracies such as these are
“subversive of the rights of others, and the law wisely says it is a
crime.” 39 Additionally, an Ohio superior court in 1889 condemned a
labor boycott as “terrorizing” a community 40 and oppressive to
individuals, the community, and the social order. 41 Finally, the
assumption that conspiracies posed an evil distinct from their
substantive target crimes 42 appeared for the first time in an 1897
957, 957 (1961) (noting that “the early condemnation of the labor union as a
criminal conspiracy and the use of the charge against political offenders”).
35. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); Consolidated Steel & Wire Co. v.
Murray, 80 F. 811 (Cir. 1897); Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310 (7th Cir. 1894); In re
Grand Jury, 62 F. 840 (N.D. Cal. 1894); Brunswick Gaslight Co. v. United Gas,
Fuel & Light Co., 27 A. 525 (Me. 1893); San Antonio Gas Co. v. State, 54 S.W.
289 (Tex. Ct. App. 1899). But see United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1,
17 (1895) (limiting the application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to a narrow set
of conspiring companies); American Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 22 So. 99, 102 (Miss.
Ct. App. 1897) (holding that conspiracies, to be punishable, must have the
“effect to injure” the public); Longshore Printing & Pub. Co. v. Howell, 38 P. 547,
548 (Or. 1894) (conspiracies themselves are not indictable; only those that
present a “threatened and imminent injury.”).
36. State v. Glidden, 8 A. 890, 891–92 (Conn. 1887).
37. Id. at 894.
38. Id. at 895.
39. Id. at 896.
40. Moores & Co. v. Bricklayers’ Union et al., 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 665, 673
(1889) (“[I]t is clear that the terrorizing of a community by threats of exclusive
dealing in order to deprive one obnoxious member of means of sustenance will
become both dangerous and oppressive.”).
41. Id. at 674 (quoting Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 6 S.E. 620 (Va.
1888)) (reasoning such a conspiracy “will be restrained and punished by the
criminal law as oppressive to the individual, injurious to the prosperity of the
community, and subversive of the peace and good order of society”).
42. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 778 (1975); United States v.
Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693 (1975); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 592–
94 (1961); United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915); United States v.
E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 35 (1895); Callan, 127 U.S. at 556 (1888); United
States v. Cassidy, 67 F. 698, 703 (N.D. Cal. 1895); State v. Setter, 18 A. 782, 784
(Conn. 1889); Commonwealth v. Judd, 2 Mass. 329, 337 (Mass. 1807); State v.
Burnham, 15 N.H. 396, 401–02 (N.H. 1844); Lambert v. People, 9 Cow. 578,
598–99 (N.Y. 1827); Commonwealth v. Putnam, 29 Pa. 296, 296–97 (1857); Neal
Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1315 (2003).

2015]

Membership Crime vs. The Right to Assemble

735

criminal law treatise, 43 which cited for support United States v.
Cassidy, a conspiracy case against railway employees in the great
Pullman strike of 1894. 44

C. Social Upheaval, New Realities
Massive immigration, urbanization, and industrialization
drove this fear of criminal conspiracy. Between 1880 and 1924,
twenty-five million immigrants arrived in the United States, 45
contributing to a population increase from fifty million 46 to 114
million over the same time. 47 These new immigrants, primarily
from eastern and southeastern Europe, 48 were distinct from both
the native-born white population and first wave immigrants, who
were mostly from Britain, Germany, and Ireland. 49 These first
immigrants had created institutions like the Knights of Labor,
political labor parties, and trade unions, 50 and erected barriers to
social entry for the new immigrants. 51 While many of the new
immigrants admired the assimilative successes of the first wave,
others remained lonely and isolated in the new world. 52 This may
have contributed to the “old-country radicalism” that led to labor
radicalism, extremes of which had been on display at Haymarket. 53
43. EMLIN MCCLAIN, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW AS NOW
ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES, VOLUME II 157 (1897) available at
http://www.amazon.com/Treatise-Criminal-Administered-United-States/dp/11
12281592/ref=sr_1_9?ie=UTF8&qid=1430951187&sr=8-9&keywords=emlin+
mcclain.
44. Id. at 157; Cassidy, 67 F. 698.
45. James R. Barrett, Americanization from the Bottom Up: Immigration
and the Remaking of the Working Class in the United States, 1880–1930, 79 J.
AM. HIST. 996, 997 (1992).
46. U. S. Dep’t. of the Interior, Census Office, Statistics of the Population of
the United States at the Tenth Census i, xxxiv (June 1, 1880), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html.
47. U.S. Census Bureau, Historical National Population Estimates, July 1,
1900 to July 1, 1999, available at http://www.census.gov/popest/data/national/
totals/pre-1980/tables/popclockest.txt.
48. Gary Gerstle, Liberty, Coercion, and the Making of Americans, 84 J. AM.
HIST. 524, 525 (1997).
49. Barrett, supra note 45, at 999–1000.
50. Id. at 999.
51. James R. Barrett & David R. Roediger, The Irish and the
“Americanization” of the “New Immigrants” in the Streets and in the Churches
of the Urban United States, 1900–1930, 24 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 3, 6 (2005).
52. Gerstle, supra note 48, at 532 (noting that some new immigrants “could
not escape the loneliness, isolation, and sadness they had felt since their
original uprooting. They never found in America the comfort and security they
had known in the Old World.”)
53. Barrett, supra note 45, at 999. This immigration wave combined in large
northern factories with a stream of Mexican migrants and the migration north
of African-American former slaves to produce a new working-class population.
Id.; David Levering, Parallels and Divergences: Assimilationist Strategies of
Afro-American and Jewish Elites from 1910 to the Early 1930s, 71 J. AM. HIST.
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Established authority responded to the new immigrants with
a concerted Americanization effort. Prior to World War I, teachers,
settlement house workers, and professional patriots worked to
acculturate the new immigrants as part of a benign assimilative
process. 54 This included efforts to inculcate capitalist values. 55
Labor unions, however, had different ideas. Their Americanization
rejected surrender to the capitalist order and aimed at asserting
one’s personal aspirations and rights. 56 Their target was often the
railways, which were vital to capitalism and the economy and were
viewed as a vital part of American civilization. 57 Pushback was
therefore not simply the manifestation of paranoid fears of the
other; it was also a rational response to a critical situation. 58
Early twentieth century developments contributed to this
crisis, which included an increase in the female labor force; 59
cohesive efforts by women to advance their interests, 60 including the
right to vote; 61 cooperation between women and AfricanAmericans 62; efforts of African-Americans on their own to advance
their interests; 63 and the work of muckraking journalists, who
publicized the poor working conditions in factories, the slums of big
cities, the treatment of African-Americans in the deep South, and
the growing power of trusts. 64
At the same time, socialist and anarchist sentiments were on
the rise. President McKinley was assassinated in 1901 by an
anarchist, and the socialist party would gain substantial support
543, 548 (1984).
54. Id.; Gerstle, supra note 48, at 530.
55. Barrett, supra note 45, at 996. At his Model T assembly plant in
Michigan, Henry Ford arranged a language and civics program for his
immigrant workers, culminating in a pageant in which his newly-American
workers would “descend from a boat scene,” and walk a gangway into a large
pot depicting the Ford English School. Id. Teachers on either side would stir the
pot, and the workers would emerge as part of one American nationality. Id.
56. Gerstle, supra note 48, at 527.
57. Mona Domosh, Selling Civilization: Toward a Cultural Analysis of
America’s Economic Empire in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Centuries, 28 TRANSACTIONS OF THE INST. OF BRITISH GEOGRAPHERS 453, 456,
461 (2004).
58. John Braeman, World War One and the Crisis of American Liberty, 16
AM. Q. 104, 111 (1964) (referring to the period as one of “psychic crisis”).
59. Barrett, supra note 45, at 1013. Between 1900 and 1920, the female labor
force doubled, and the Women’s Trade Union League, founded in 1903, played
an important socializing role for immigrant women. Id.
60. INAZU, supra note 5, at 44.
61. Id. at 44–45. From 1907 to 1917 the National American Woman Suffrage
Association’s membership grew from 45,000 to two million. Id. at 45.
62. In 1908, for example, prominent feminists, African-American leaders,
and other Americans called for a conference to discuss “present evils, the voicing
of protests, and the renewal of the struggle for civil and political liberty.” Id.
63. Id. The first National Negro Conference that followed would lead to the
formation of the NAACP in 1909. Id.
64. Dimitri von Mohrenschildt, Reformers and Radicals in Pre-World War I
America, 17 RUSSIAN REV. 128, 129 (1958).
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across the country for its position of neutrality going into World War
I. 65 These developments, in light of the Haymarket violence, led to
the Immigration Act of 1903, which authorized the exclusion and
deportation of anarchist aliens. 66
Finally, the Industrial Workers of the World (I.W.W.) was
founded in 1905, members of which would later become the victims
of criminal conspiracy and syndicalism charges in the WWI era. 67
Three years later, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was
created. 68 Initially intended to enforce only interstate commerce
and anti-trust laws, it quickly came to monitor and quash political
dissent. 69

D. A Calm Before the Storm
In the years prior to WWI, there were no substantive federal
disloyalty statutes, and intellectuals largely rejected complete
assimilation. 70 At the same time, there was a growing realization
that the First Amendment deserved more attention. 71 By around
1911, a new generation of protesters emerged who were “more
radically inclined and had little faith in political reform.” 72 In the
same year, the Free Speech League formed, 73 which would defend
many I.W.W. members (“Wobblies”) in court. 74
This was remarkable. In the 1880s, anarchists at Haymarket
were convicted of killing police officers and one contributor to the
Albany Law Journal wrote that there was “no shibboleth more
absurd than the cry of free speech.” 75 Yet after a period of massive
65. James Weinstein, Anti-War Sentiment and the Socialist Party, 1917–
1918, 74 POL. SCI. Q. 215, 216 (1959).
66. The Immigration Act of 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213 (1903).
67. Ahmed A. White, The Crime of Economic Radicalism: Criminal
Syndicalism Laws and the Industrial Workers of the World, 1917–1927, 85 OR.
L. REV. 649, 650 (2006).
68. Federal Bureau of Investigation, A Brief History of the FBI, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/brief-history.
69. Athan G. Theoharis, Dissent and the State: Unleashing the FBI, 1917–
1985, HIST. TCHR. 41 (1990).
70. Lewis, supra note 53, at 553. The paradigm of “‘Anglo-conformity’ – the
Wilsonian dogma that a ‘hyphenated’ American was an impossibility” – was
rejected. Id.
71. Mohrenschildt, supra note 64, at 129. Indeed, in 1958, the historian,
anti-communist, and member of the Office of Strategic Services (the forerunner
to the CIA), Dmitri von Mohrenchildt, observed that “the two decades preceding
World War I saw the most extensive movement of social protest this country
had thus far known.” Id.
72. Id. at 134.
73. Alexis J. Anderson, The Formative Period of First Amendment Theory,
1870–1915, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 56, 60 (1980).
74. Laura M. Weinrib, The Sex Side of Civil Liberties: United States v.
Dennett and the Changing Face of Free Speech, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 325, 334
n. 27 (2012).
75. Anderson, supra note 74, at 61.
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immigration and fundamental social upheaval, society seemed
nevertheless to be coming to terms with radicalism and even
supporting their First Amendment rights. While radical groups
were still monitored, the application of conspiracy law to subversive
group conduct and the imperative of social control appeared to be
moderating.
One reason was that conspiracy was replaced with the
injunction as a tool of union control. 76 In addition, it had become
clear that labor unions played an important role in society, and their
legal rights had been largely defined. The harms that capital could
impose had likewise been recognized, and the law limited what
companies could do. 77 Looking backward, conspiracy no longer
served an anti-union purpose. Looking forward, radical protesters
did not yet have an antiwar cause to pursue, and so government had
little need to silence them.

V.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: WORLD WAR I

For the first three years of WWI, German sympathizers and
other radicals in the United States suffered no crackdown because
the country and the Wilson administration remained staunchly
neutral. The first months of 1917, however, brought German
attacks on U.S. maritime interests 78 and Germany’s proposed
alliance with Mexico against the U.S. 79 Once Congress declared
war, President Wilson announced that “censorship . . . is absolutely
necessary to the public safety.” 80
The government quickly moved to censor dissenting speech,
investigate dissident groups, and use conspiracy law to undermine
First Amendment activities. Government and private entities
combined to enforce, sometimes through violence, total national
76. HATTAM, supra note 31, at 39.
77. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, which limited the right of capital
to collaborate, is an example. Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–
7 (2014); See Sherman Anti-Trust Act (1890): Document Info, OUR DOCUMENTS,
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=51 (last visited July 12,
2015) (showing original document). Another is the Adamson Act of 1916, a
federal law that established the eight-hour workday and overtime pay for
interstate railway workers, passed to avoid an impending strike. Adamson Act
of 1916, 45 U.S.C. §§ 65–66 (repealed 1996); see also Wilson v. New, 243 U.S.
332, 376 (1917) (Pitney, J., dissenting) (mentioning that the Adamson Act
should be invalidated and that “[t]he suggestion that it was passed to prevent a
threatened strike” gives it no greater legal effect).
78. Supplement: Correspondence Between the United States and Belligerent
Governments Relating to Neutral Rights and Commerce: Submarine Warfare –
Germany, 11 AM. J. INT’L L. 52, 132, 152–53 (1917).
79. Mary Alexander & Marilyn Childress, Teaching With Documents: The
Zimmermann Telegram, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/educ
ation/lessons/zimmermann/.
80. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA:
A HISTORY 241 (2008).
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loyalty. 81 Army troops broke up I.W.W. strikes in the northwest, 82
anti-union mob violence emerged, 83 and by October of 1918, a new
immigration law facilitated the deportation of a handful of
Wobblies. Such deportation would increase during the Red Scare a
few years later. 84 The Bureau of Investigation, now a tool for
monitoring dissent, 85 participated in the 1918 “Slacker Raids,”
which indiscriminately rounded up young men in major cities,
ostensibly to enforce the war’s draft law. 86 The Bureau also began
to monitor politicians, judges, and anyone else perceived to be
disloyal. 87 Within one year of its passage, 250 people had been
convicted under the Espionage Act. 88

VI. SCHENCK, FROHWERK, AND ABRAMS: SUBSTANTIVE
FIRST AMENDMENT’S ADVENT
Schenck, Frohwerk, and Abrams, viewed today as seminal free
speech cases, emerged from the era’s “mass sedition indictments” 89
and primarily considered conspiracies, rather than completed
speech. Therefore, they should be viewed as assembly cases as much
as or more than speech cases.

A. Schenck v. United States and Frohwerk v. United
States
Decided on March 3, 1919, the defendants in Schenck 90 had
been convicted of conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act, 91
81. Id. at 246–47. “Probusiness, antiunion, antialien, and anti-immigrant”
groups joined with the administration, and “belligerently demanded universal
conformity organized through total national loyalty . . . . [I]n hundreds of
incidences, German aliens, German Americans, Socialists, pacifists, Wobblies,
and other outsiders were flogged, tarred and feathered, forced to kiss the flag,
and murdered.” Id.
82. Braeman, supra note 58, at 106–07.
83. Id. at 111.
84. Id. at 107.
85. Theoharis, supra note 69, at 41–42.
86. Christopher Capozzola, The Only Badge Needed Is Your Patriotic Fervor:
Vigilance, Coercion, and the Law in World War I America, 88 J. AM. HIST. 1354,
1380 (2002).
87. Theoharis, supra note 69, at 41–43.
88. Ch. 30, tit. 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (Comp. St. 1918, § 10212c); FELDMAN,
supra note 81, at 248.
89. Weinstein, supra note 65, at 236.
90. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
91. Id. at 48–49. Section three of the Espionage Act stated:
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey
false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the
operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or
to promote the success of its enemies and whoever, when the United
States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination,
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conspiracy to use the mails for the illegal transmission of socialist
political tracts, and using the mails to send the tracts. 92 Charles
Schenck was the general secretary of the Socialist party, which had
decided to send 15,000 leaflets to young draft-eligible men. 93 In
hopes of convincing recipients to avoid the draft, the socialists
invoked the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on slavery 94 and
asked the men to “assert [their] rights.” 95
This leaflet had no effect on recruitment or the draft. Instead,
the Court affirmed the conviction based on the defendants’ mere
hope of hindering the war effort. 96 Writing for the majority, Justice
Holmes established the clear and present danger test. 97 One week
later, writing again for the majority in Frohwerk, whose facts were
functionally the same as in Schenck, 98 Holmes made it clear that
this test offered no protection to the defendants. 99

B. Abrams v. United States
After Schenck and Frohwerk, Holmes’ friends lobbied him to
recognize the importance of First Amendment rights. 100 This was
probably one reason Holmes would dissent in Abrams, a case in
which the Court affirmed the conviction of radicals for conspiracy to
violate the Espionage and Sedition Acts. 101 Abrams, furthermore,
was sufficiently different than Schenck and Frohwerk to compel
Holmes to dissent. Although the Abrams’ facts were functionally the

disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the
United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment
services of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
$10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.
Espionage Act, Ch. 30, title 1, § 3, 40 Stat. 219 (1917) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §792 (2011)). Section four of the Espionage Act provided that
conspiracy to commit any of the offenses contained in section three was a crime.
Espionage Act, Ch. 30, title 1, § 4, 40 Stat. 219 (1917)
92. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 48–49.
93. Id. at 49–50.
94. Id. at 50–51.
95. Id. at 51.
96. Id. at 52–53.
97. Id. at 52 (“The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”).
98. Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
99. Id. at 208–09 (holding that the anti-war articles in a German language
newspaper could be published “in quarters where a little breath would be
enough to kindle a flame” that would undermine the war effort).
100. Richard M. Abrams, Oliver Wendell Holmes and American Liberalism,
19 REVS. AM. HIST. 86, 89 (1991); THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND – AND CHANGED THE HISTORY
OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 158 (2013).
101. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 616, 624 (1919).
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same as those in Schenck and Frohwerk, 102 Holmes found that they
posed no danger. 103 In addition, Holmes may have understood that
the excesses of the Sedition Act led to the Abrams prosecution,
which was an effort to punish ideas, rather than a good faith
attempt to thwart interference with the war effort. 104 Indeed, the
list of prohibited activities in the Sedition Act created a membership
crime by prohibiting almost anything that an anti-war group might
have wished to do. 105
Schenck, Frohwerk, and Abrams, like so many of the other
WWI-era cases, were conspiracy cases because prosecutors were not
concerned with lone radicals, speaking to passers-by on a street
corner. Instead, they were concerned with groups that were
perceived threats to social order. 106

VII. THE CONSPIRACY CASES: 1918–1921
A number of specific cases in the WWI era illustrate the
widespread concern with groups and the use of conspiracy law
against them.

102. The Abrams defendants – self-described rebels, revolutionists,
anarchists, and Socialists – were convicted of printing, writing, and distributing
5,000 leaflets in New York City that opposed capitalism as the enemy of the
world’s workers, and appealed to American workers to arise and put down by
force the government of the United States. Id. at 617–20. The leaflet’s florid
language advised readers to “spit in the face of the false, hypocritic, military
propaganda which has fooled you so relentlessly, calling forth your sympathy,
your help, to the prosecution of the war.” Id. at 620. It admonished people: “Do
not let the government scare you with their wild punishment in prisons,
hanging and shooting. We must not and will not betray the splendid fighters of
Russia. Workers, up to fight.” Id. at 622.
103. See id. at 629 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (calling the defendants “poor and
puny anonymities”).
104. Vincent Blasi, Reading Holmes Through the Lens of Schauer: The
Abrams Dissent, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1352 (1997).
105. Sedition Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 [Comp. St. 1918, §
10212c]. With the amendment, it had become a crime to say anything with
intent to obstruct the sale of war bonds or government securities; say anything
to obstruct the making of government loans; incite, attempt to incite, or attempt
to “utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive
language about the form of the” government, the Constitution, the military, the
flag, or military uniforms; use any language intended to bring these things “into
contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute”; utter, print, write, or publish
anything intended to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the United
States; willfully display the flag of a foreign enemy; and urge or advocate any
curtailment of production of any product necessary to the war effort. Id.
106. This was reflected in the 19th century sentiment that what one worker
says or does may be legal, but that when 100 workers say or do it, it may be
illegal. See Glidden, 8 A. 890, 895 (Conn. 1887) (“Any one man, or any one of
several men, acting independently, is powerless; but when several combine, and
direct their united energies to the accomplishment of a bad purpose, the
combination is formidable.”).
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In Howenstine v. United States, 107 the defendant was convicted
of conspiring to violate the Espionage Act by giving to another man,
who was subject to the draft, a pair of eyeglasses that would impair
the man’s vision, permitting him to avoid induction. 108 The Ninth
Circuit observed that this gift “unquestionably would tend to cause
disloyalty on [the draftee’s part] and refusal of military service.” 109
In State v. Townley, 110 the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed
convictions for conspiracy to teach or advocate that men should not
enlist in the military, or that citizens should not aid the United
States in its war effort. 111 The defendants had made anti-war
speeches and distributed pamphlets that were intended to dissuade
people from buying Liberty Bonds; teach people that it was the poor
farmers, rather than the rich, who were being drafted; show that
the poor were paying for the war twice, with their lives and their
tax dollars; and to oppose American autocracy at home before
attempting to relieve Europeans of German autocracy. 112
In In re O’Connell, 113 the California Supreme Court disbarred
an attorney, finding that his conspiracy to persuade others to avoid
the draft and “mak[ing] false certificates concerning liability for
military service” 114 amounted to “moral turpitude.” 115
In Sykes v. United States, 116 members of the Church of the
Living God encouraged other church members not to contribute to
the Red Cross, buy Liberty Bonds, display the American flag, visit
the homes of others who displayed the flag, or register as alien
enemies. 117 The defendants also told their congregation that the
German army represented the Lord’s chosen people and would be
victorious. 118 They were convicted of conspiracy to violate a number
of the war-enabling acts and the Espionage Act. 119
In United States v. Steene, 120 a defendant was convicted of
conspiracy under the Espionage Act for distributing antiwar

107. Howenstine v. United States, 263 F. 1 (9th Cir. 1920).
108. Id. at 2.
109. Id. at 5.
110. State v. Townley, 182 N.W. 773 (Minn. 1921).
111. Id. at 774–75.
112. Id. at 776–77.
113. In re O’Connell, 194 P. 1010 (Cal. 1920).
114. O’Connell v. United States, 253 U.S. 142, 147 (1920).
115. In re O’Connell, 194 P. 184 Cal. at 1011–12.
116. Sykes v. United States, 264 F. 945 (9th Cir. 1920).
117. Id. at 946.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 946.
120. United States v. Steene, 263 F. 130 (N.D.N.Y. 1920), rev’d, 255 U.S. 580
(1921).
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leaflets, 121 with the defendant’s free speech argument ignored. 122
These leaflets, concluded the court, were “well calculated to have
the effect of arousing the contempt, scorn, contumely, and disrepute
which Congress has sought to prevent.” 123
Two months after Steene, the same result was obtained in
Schoborg v. United States. 124 In that case, defendant Charles
Schoborg, a 66-year-old immigrant from Germany who had arrived
in the United States as a child, ran a cobbler’s shop. 125 He had been
a city policeman, marshal, a member of the board of trustees, and a
city council member. 126 The local German community used his shop
as a place for meeting, gossip, and conversation. 127 Frequent
attendees included a 65-year-old tobacco dealer and banker, who
had been born in the United States, and a 56-year-old native-born
treasurer of a local brewery. 128 These men often visited the cobbler’s
shop “‘as a loafing place’ to sit down and talk and ‘meet the same
old crowd.’” 129
“Desiring to know what was going on,” a group of citizens hired
a detective agency to wiretap the cobbler’s shop. 130 Agency
employees recorded some of what they heard for a period of five or
six weeks. 131 Based on this information, the three loafers were
indicted for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act. The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the conviction, giving short shrift to First
Amendment concerns. 132
121. Id. at 132. One leaflet depicted a man and the descriptive words: “Hung
by the wrists from ceiling for 8 Hours a Day. McNeil’s Island, Washington.” Id.
Another depicted a man who had apparently been beaten with a club, under
which appeared, “Political Prisoners Beaten with a Baseball Bat at
Leavenworth Penitentiary.” Id. Another depicted a man with a pistol and army
hat, kicking a hapless victim, described as “Punishment of a Conscientious
Objector in Disciplinary Barracks.” Id.
122. Id. at 133.
123. Id.
124. Schoborg v. United States, 264 F. 1 (6th Cir. 1920).
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 6–7 (noting:
It is strenuously insisted that defendants’ conduct could not be thought
to have any direct tendency to cause the obnoxious “substantive evils,”
because what they said was spoken secretly and among themselves.
However true this might be of the ordinary, casual conversation, it cannot
reach the long-continued maintenance of an intensive school of disloyalty.
Even if the talk had been confined to the three respondents, the
cumulative effect upon each of what the others said would be to
aggravate, if not cause, an extremity and recklessness in opposition to the
war and favor to the enemy which would be an incitement to direct
obstruction and injury in the many ways open to the evil disposed in that
vicinity. But the talk was not confined to these three. Several others were
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Four days before the decision in Schoborg, the Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Pierce v. United States. 133 In that case, the
Court affirmed a conviction for an Espionage Act conspiracy based
on a distribution of a Socialist anti-war pamphlet called “The Price
We Pay.” 134 The lower court had given deference to the jury to
determine the probable effects of the leaflet’s distribution and the
defendants’ intent. 135 While the jury can determine such questions
of fact, Justice Brandeis in his dissent protested that the trial court
had given to the jury questions of law to decide. 136 To Brandeis, the
trial court should have directed a verdict for the defendants because
the pamphlet could have no criminal effect, and therefore was
protected by the First Amendment. 137

A. The Role of Conspiracy
Conspiracy not only provided a mechanism for prosecuting
people who only spoke, and did not act, but it also provided a work
around nascent First Amendment rights. Because prosecutors had
to find legal justifications for prosecutions arising out of defendants’
exercise of First Amendment protected activity, there were limits to
what conspiracy law could justify. United States v. Strong 138 was an
exceptional case that demonstrates the rule. In Strong, a
Washington District Court dismissed an Espionage Act charge,
predicated upon the publication of an editorial in the Union Record,
charged to be disloyal, scurrilous, and abusive toward the U.S.
government. 139 The court observed that mere advocacy of anarchy
or sedition could not be a crime, unless it comprised an actual
conspiracy. 140
present more or less, and that the influence of such a center would radiate
through an appreciable part of the community is too sure for doubt.).
133. Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
134. Id. at 241. Issued by the Socialist party in Chicago, the antiwar
pamphlet advised readers that draftees would be given guns and taught not to
think but obey, and “shipped thru [sic] the submarine zone by the hundreds of
thousands to the bloody quagmire of Europe . . . . [B]lack death will be a guest
at every American fireside. Mothers and fathers and sisters, wives and
sweethearts will know the weight of that awful vacancy left by the bullet which
finds its mark.” Id. at 245–46. It went on to assert that the entry into the war
was “determined by the certainty that if the Allies do not win, J. P. Morgan’s
loans to the Allies will be repudiated, and those American investors who bit on
his promises would be hooked.” Id. at 247.
135. Id. at 244, 249–50.
136. Id. at 269–71.
137. Id. at 272 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that the pamphlet “was not
distributed under such circumstances, nor was it of such a nature, as to create
a clear and present danger of causing either insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny
or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces.”).
138. United States v. Strong, 263 F. 789 (W.D.Wash. 1920).
139. Id. at 789.
140. Id. at 791–92 (“[T]he advocacy of anarchy and sedition, or overthrow of
government, is no crime, under the general statutes or law as presently enacted,
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But advocating sedition or overthrow of the government could
easily be seen as an Espionage Act violation! The court certainly
knew this, and so it was not making a statement regarding the
statutory law. Rather, it was possible that the court was making a
statement that the First Amendment protected such advocacy
despite the law. However, even this progressive and speechprotective statement highlighted conspiracy’s usefulness as a workaround: one could not be charged directly with advocacy, but one
could be charged with conspiracy, which, to the court, was on par
with treason and rebellion.

B. The House that Jack Built
In addition to conspiracy as a First Amendment work-around,
conspiracy could also be used to reach unpopular people far removed
from criminality. On review of an I.W.W. conspiracy conviction, 141
the Seventh Circuit observed what it called the “house that Jack
built” problem. 142 The defendant had been convicted for interfering
with the operations of private companies that had contracted to
provide war munitions to the government. 143 Questioning whether
Congress intended that a law that criminalized conspiracies to “use
force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the
United States” should reach conduct so attenuated from substantive
crime, the court observed:
The Government Printing Office is conducted under laws directing,
and making appropriations for, its operations. Any direct interference
by force with its operations might possibly be held to be a forcible
prevention of the execution of laws of the United States
. . . . But
the printing office cannot operate without paper. Suppose the
workmen in a paper mill that has a contract to supply paper to the
printing office, with knowledge of the contract and with intent to
prevent the mill from fulfilling it, go on strike and forcibly prevent
the running of the mill. Suppose that workmen in a hemlock forest,
whose owner has a contract to supply paper to the printing office, with
knowledge of those contracts and with the intent to prevent their
execution, go on strike and forcibly stop the timberman’s operations.
And so on, along the whole imaginable line of “the house that Jack
built.” 144

unless the acts amount to treason, rebellion, or seditious conspiracy; nor is
advising or advocating unlawful obstruction of industry, or unlawful or violent
destruction of private property, a crime under the laws of the United States.”).
141. Haywood v. United States, 268 F. 795 (7th Cir. 1920).
142. Id. at 800.
143. Id. at 799.
144. Id. at 800.
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VIII. THE RED SCARE: 1920
On June 2, 1919, a bomb exploded at the home of Attorney
General A. Mitchell Palmer, the architect of the Red Raids that
would follow only five months later. 145 This attack, joined with
Palmer’s concern over leftist disloyalty, discriminatory FBI
investigations, and the formation of the Lusk Committee in 1919
provoked investigation of people and groups for sedition. 146 The
Socialist party, furthermore, had been marginalized and with the
war over and wartime production no longer an imperative, the labor
unions had lost the leverage that they had recently enjoyed. Soaring
prices in 1919, however, compelled them to ask for higher wages,
which led to strikes and violence. 147 The country was also worried
about the effects of the Bolshevik revolution and Soviet Russia’s
intent to spread communism throughout the world.
November 1919 saw the first of the Red Raids, during which
federal and local authorities would raid meeting places, close down
presses, seize records, and jail or deport immigrant activists. 148
Mainstream political figures were targeted for investigation. 149
Others who favored various causes, such as “Irish-Americans who
favored Irish independence, Jews who advocated the establishment
of a national homeland in Palestine, civil libertarians who defended
the rights of dissidents, and anyone who argued that the United
States should recognize the Soviet Union,” were investigated. 150
On January 2, 1920, the Red Raids reached their peak. On that
Friday night, FBI agents and local police in thirty-three cities
arrested as many as 10,000 people. While the targets were members
of the Communist or Communist Labor parties, others were
arrested simply because FBI Director Hoover regarded them as
subversive. 151
In Colyer v. Skeffington, 152 a group of twenty aliens had been
arrested on January 2 in Boston simply for their membership in the

145. Braeman, supra note 58, at 108–09.
146. John Lord O’Brian, Restraints Upon Individual Freedom in Times of
National Emergency, 26 CORNELL L. Q. 523, 525 (1940–41).
147. Braeman, supra note 58, at 108–09.
148. Barrett, supra note 45, at 1019.
149. David Williams, The Bureau of Investigation and Its Critics, 1919–1921:
The Origins of Federal Political Surveillance, 68 J. AM. HIST. 560, 572 (1981).
Even Zechariah Chafee, Felix Frankfurter, and others – Holmes’ friends who
convinced him of the value of individual speech rights – were investigated as
subversives. Id.
150. Id. at 577.
151. Id. at 561 (“[M]any persons not affiliated with communist parties and
not mentioned in arrest warrants were seized simply because they had attended
lawful political or social functions that [BI Director] Hoover and his staff
regarded as subversive.”).
152. Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17 (D. Mass. 1920), rev’d on other grounds,
277 F. 129 (1st. Cir. 1922).
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Communist or Communist Labor party. 153 Leaders of the targeted
organizations were supposed to have instructed their members “to
destroy all evidence of membership or affiliation with their
respective organizations.” 154 Agents were therefore ordered “to
ascertain the location of all of the books and records of these
organizations” and obtain admissions that the targets were group
members. 155 306 arrest warrants were drawn up, 156 with “charges
pertaining to [Communist Party] membership merely.” 157 Evidence
of membership, therefore, was particularly important, which
included “individual tenets, beliefs and practices.” 158 It was clear
that they were targeting group membership, and not criminal
activity. 159
The judge on the case called the government agents “a mob” 160
that acted with a “disregard of law and of properly verified facts.” 161
For example, authorities arrested and held overnight thirty-nine
people in Lynn, who were meeting to discuss forming a co-operative
bakery. 162 The court questioned the reliability of arresting so many
people simply for group conduct. 163 Indeed, the judge’s prior
experience as a United States Attorney
taught him that “99 percent of the spy plots were pure fake” . . . [that
g]uilt . . . was personal, and the government could not deport persons
because of membership in certain political or labor organizations . . .
[g]uilt by association . . . had no place in American society. 164

IX.

THE STATE SYNDICALISM CASES: 1921–1925

While the Espionage Act, Sedition Act, and other war enabling
acts were being used to charge dissidents with conspiracy at the
federal level, an equally impactful system of repression was
emerging state by state. States began passing criminal syndicalism
153. Id. at 21.
154. Id. at 31.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 33.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 34.
159. Id. at 31–32 (noting that the directive from Washington was to obtain
“documentary evidence proving membership,” and “particular effort [should be]
given to finding the membership book”).
160. Id. at 43.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 47 (“[M]any of these aliens were arrested in boarding houses or
halls in which were found large quantities of literature and pamphlets, the
origin and ownership of which were necessarily largely matters of guesswork.
In cases of doubt, aliens, already frightened by the terroristic methods of their
arrest and detention, were, in the absence of counsel, easily led into some kind
of admission as to their ownership or knowledge of communistic or so-called
seditious literature.”).
164. Williams, supra note 150, at 565–66.
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statutes around 1917, and by 1921 the majority of the states had
nearly identical laws. 165 The Oregon Supreme Court likened these
laws to conspiracy law and observed that they received their
primary principles from it, including their use for socio-political
control. 166
California’s law was applied more than any other state’s
syndicalism law, and was virtually identical to those states’
syndicalism laws. 167 It defined syndicalism as advocating or
teaching crime, sabotage, or other illegal acts to achieve industrial
or political change, 168 and it criminalized organizing, assisting in
organizing, or membership in a group that organized or assembled
to advocate or teach syndicalism. 169
Syndicalism statutes created a new type of broad membership
crime. Whereas traditional conspiracy law required an agreement
to commit a crime, an overt act in furtherance of it, and intent to
both agree and to commit the substantive crime, 170 syndicalism
statutes required mere membership. In essence, they criminalized
any association with certain groups, especially the I.W.W.

A. The Cases
The first syndicalism conviction, affirmed by the Minnesota
Supreme Court, was probably State v. Moilen. 171 The defendant had
posted around town tiny signs supporting the I.W.W. and warning
of sabotage. 172 Sabotage was the Court’s major concern, which it
referred to as “terrorism,” 173 even though the Court offered that it
had innocent meanings as well, which the posters might have
advocated. 174 Based on this benign potential, the Court might have
vacated the conviction because the state had failed to prove
advocacy of any crime. 175 The Court, however, shifted the burden to

165. People v. Lloyd, 136 N.E. 505, 537 (Ill. 1922) (Carter, J., dissenting).
166. State v. Boloff, 7 P.2d 775, (Or. 1932) (These crimes are “the quicksands
of the law . . . too frequently . . . subject to the shifting public sentiment which
always affects matters pertaining to government.”).
167.
168. People v. McClennegen, 234 P. 91, 93 (Cal. 1925).
169. Id.
170. See Windsor v. United States, 286 F. 51, 54–55 (6th Cir. 1923)
(delineating the elements of criminal conspiracy).
171. State v. Moilen, 167 N.W. 345 (Minn. 1918).
172. Id. at 348. He posted four types of 1x2-inch “posters,” proclaiming,
“Beware Sabotage,” “Join the One Big Union,” “Industrial Unionism, Abolition
of the Wage System, Join the I.W.W.,” and “Sabotage means to push back, pull
out or break off the fangs of Capitalism.” Id.
173. Id. at 347.
174. Id. at 348–49 (“[T]he posters which [the] defendant distributed and
caused to be publicly displayed do not attempt to limit the sabotage thus
advocated.”).
175. Id.
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the defendant to prove his innocence. 176 The Court, furthermore,
found sufficient evidence to convict because one of the posters
depicted a “snarling black cat.” 177
While Moilen was not a membership crime case, it did share
with such cases two elements. First was the a priori assumption of
the criminal nature of certain groups and the meaning of vague
words like “sabotage.” Second was the apparent need of the Court
to affirm a socially and politically popular conviction. Unusual
burden shifting and a priori assumptions were necessary to this end
because criminal syndicalists virtually always engaged in the most
minor of conduct.
In People v. Lesse, 178 for example, the California Appellate
Court affirmed a conviction for I.W.W. membership. The evidence
against the defendant was an I.W.W. book 179 that set forth the
group’s doctrine. 180 The defendant had nothing to do with this book,
and its contents were not described. 181 Instead, it was used merely
to connect the defendant to the I.W.W., of whose criminal nature
the court took judicial notice. 182 In addition, the trial court
permitted jurors to sit who had the same a priori assumption. 183
In another California case, 184 the defendant pointed to this a
priori assumption, and argued unsuccessfully that criminalizing
membership in the I.W.W. was “an attempt to create the crime of
constructive conspiracy in violation of the constitutional right of
personal liberty.” 185

B. Conspiracy, the First Amendment, and Group
Criminality
People v. Lloyd displayed the role that conspiracy and
substantive First Amendment rights played in bolstering the
assumption of group criminality. 186 In Lloyd, the Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed a syndicalism conspiracy conviction of eighteen
176. Id. at 349 (“If [the] defendant intended some innocent phase of the
doctrine of sabotage he should have made it appear on the face of the posters.”).
177. Id. at 348.
178. People v. Lesse, 199 P. 46, 48 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921).
179. Id. at 47.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. (“[T]he purposes of the I.W.W. are a part of the current history of
the day – a part of the history of the times. We are informed by the magazines,
encyclopedias, and dictionaries of the day that the organization advocates
criminal syndicalism, revolutionary violence, and sabotage.”).
183. Id. at 47–48 (Although “[s]everal jurors stated on their voir dire that
they entertained unfavorable opinions of the I.W.W. . . . [A]ll jurors who read
must know in a general way all about the I.W.W. Those who cannot read are
not competent jurors anyway.”).
184. People v. Thompson, 229 P. 896 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924).
185. Id. at 897.
186. People v. Lloyd, 136 N.E. 505 (Ill. 1922).
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members of the Communist Labor party. 187 The court rejected the
defendants’ First Amendment argument, observing that criminal
liability might not attach for minor and non-dangerous acts, but
that it could attach for mere advocacy of such acts. 188 Where the
charge was conspiracy, the First Amendment had no traction
because conspiracy is complete upon agreement, however nondangerous it might be. 189 In dissent, Judge Carter recognized the
membership crime work-around of the First Amendment, observing
that the Illinois syndicalism law was not passed for public safety,
but for socio-political control. 190

C. Career Government Witnesses
To prove up tenuous syndicalism charges against the I.W.W.,
prosecutors often called group members, who had supposedly
rejected their criminal pasts, to testify. In the California
syndicalism cases, Elbert Coutts was a regular government
witness. 191 A former Wobbly, he made his living first by stealing, 192
and then as a professional witness against I.W.W. members. 193
Coutts and other former I.W.W. members testified at at least two
trials that the I.W.W. had been responsible for a series of
mysterious haystack burnings. 194 In fact, Coutts himself
participated in setting fires. 195 The I.W.W., furthermore, had never
committed any crime, but the conceit was that individual members,
by virtue of their membership, were dangerous criminals. 196
187. Id. at 537.
188. Id. at 512 (“[I]f the acts are too trivial for the law’s notice, and create
no apparent danger and no perturbation in the peaceful order of things, then no
crime is committed; but if the means advocated are apparently adapted to the
end, then the public peace, so far as advocacy is concerned, is as much disturbed
as if they should be so actually.”).
189. Id. at 515.
190. Id. at 109, 112 (Carter, J., dissenting) (The law was designed to “forbid[]
any person who held opinions distasteful to the majority of our citizens to
express those opinions.” If strictly enforced, the law could be used to punish not
only disloyal acts but also “to punish citizens because they are thought to be
disloyal at heart, or not in sympathy with the policies of the government.”).
191. JOHN S. GAMBS, THE DECLINE OF THE I.W.W. 29 (1966).
192. AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 63 (1995).
193. Id. (recounting that after Coutts left the Wobblies, “his chief source of
income was the $250 per case, above expenses, he got from the government for
his testimony in more than 40 trials of I.W.W. members”).
194. People v. Wright, 66 Cal.App. 782, 786 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924); People
v. Roe, 58 Cal.App. 690, 700 (Cal. 1922).
195. People v. Wright, 226 P. 952, 953 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924).
196. People v. Roe, 58 Cal.App. 690, 700–01 (1922) (former Wobbly, John
Dymond, testified that the “wholesale destruction of property was caused by the
direct acts of members of the I.W.W.,” and that “while no specific action was
ever taken by the organization,” one of the I.W.W.’s rules was that its members
should “act on their own initiative whenever they thought it necessary to
accomplish” the goals of the organization).
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Joe Arada, another regular government witness, added his own
fanciful story. In numerous cases, 197 Arada testified that he had
been employed on a potato farm. 198 On one particular day, a group
of workers showed up, worked, and slept in the laborers’ bunkhouse
with Arada and others. 199 They left early the next day, before the
others awoke, without taking their breakfast or asking for their
day’s pay. 200 Later, in the fields, Arada’s feet started to burn. 201 This
was a result, he claimed, of the potassium hydroxide that had been
placed in his shoes by Wobbly saboteurs. 202 I.W.W. papers, he would
testify, were found in the bunkhouse the morning the mysterious
laborers left, which had not been there before. 203
No specific defendant was ever connected to any crime, and no
evidence emerged that the I.W.W. in fact ordered its members to
engage in crime. The assumption, however, was that the group was
a persistent, shadowy criminal enterprise, which drove the
admission of what today would be considered non-probative 204 and
unfairly prejudicial evidence. 205

D. Defining Groups, Ensnaring Individuals
Under syndicalism and conspiracy laws, the I.W.W. became a
great amorphous bogeyman, a stand-in for people’s greatest
inchoate fears. 206 The law could be applied to any unpopular group
197. Wright, 226 P. 952 at 953; People v. La Rue, 216 P. 627, 630 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1923); Roe, 209 P. at 383–84.
198. Wright, 226 P. 952 at 953–54.
199. Id. at 954.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. In People v. Bailey, some of the I.W.W. literature introduced to prove
the group’s criminality was of “ancient vintage,” published prior to the passage
of California’s syndicalism act. 225 P. 752, 756 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924).
“[S]ome of it advocated, though in an indirect way, the resort to unlawful
activities to carry out its great central idea.” Id.
205. Again in Bailey, the California district court considered the testimony
of Coutts and another unreliable former Wobbly, W.E. Townsend. Id. at 754.
The court held this evidence admissible “upon the theory that the Industrial
Workers of the World constituted a confederation or combination whose purpose
was to accomplish its objects by unlawful or criminal means, and that it is a
continuing conspiracy, and will remain so until its ultimate objects are
accomplished.” Id. at 756.
206. See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 446–47 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring). (alluding to this problem, Supreme Court Justice Robert
Jackson observed in 1949, “The modern crime of conspiracy is so vague that it
almost defies definition . . . . [c]hameleon-like, [conspiracy] takes on a special
coloration from each of the many independent offenses on which it may be
overlaid”). And the first-ever critical treatment of conspiracy law offered “[a]
doctrine so vague in its outlines and uncertain in its fundamental nature as
criminal conspiracy lends no strength or glory to the law; it is a veritable
quicksand of shifting opinion and ill-considered thought.” Francis B. Sayre,
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du jour; once applied, courts’ and jurors’ a priori assumption of the
I.W.W.’s criminality virtually ensured a guilty verdict.
The mens rea required in such cases was always set at a low
bar. Some courts required that the defendant knowingly belong to
an organization “which in its nature was a criminal conspiracy.” 207
Others rejected any mens rea requirement. 208 Still others
interpreted syndicalism to be a strict liability crime. 209 For example,
the Oregon Supreme Court held that membership in the I.W.W.
alone was sufficient for liability. 210
Prosecutors’ goal, therefore, was to damn the group and ignore
the individual. In Burns v. United States, for example, the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed a syndicalism conviction, which had been
based on evidence primarily intended to establish the nature of the
I.W.W., not the defendant’s conduct. 211 Justice Brandeis,
dissenting, noted that the evidence regarding the group related
mainly to acts of individuals unrelated to the defendant. 212 Guilt by
alleged association operated, 213 leading to criminal liability in some
absurd circumstances.
People v. Wright 214 was such a case. It is commonly believed
that criminal conspiracies operate in secret. 215 This makes sense,
for if they were overt, they would not succeed and the conspirators
Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1922).
207. People v. Steelik, 203 P. 78, 84 (Cal. 1921).
208. McClennegen, 234 P. at 101.
209. State v. Hennessy, 195 P. 211, 217 (Wash. 1921).
210. Boloff, 7 P.2d at 777.
211. Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. 328 (1927).
212. Id. at 340 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
213. In Whitney v. California, Justice Brandeis voted to affirm a syndicalism
conviction even though syndicalism, he wrote,
[I]s a crime very unlike the old felony of conspiracy or the old
misdemeanor of unlawful assembly. The mere act of assisting in forming
a society for teaching syndicalism, of becoming a member of it, or
assembling with others for that purpose is given the dynamic quality of
crime . . . The novelty in the prohibition introduced is that the statute
aims, not at the practice of criminal syndicalism, nor even directly at the
preaching of it, but at association with those who propose to preach it.
274. U.S. 357, 372–73 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Similarly, in State v. Boloff, a dissenting Judge Belt described the extent to
which conspiracy law could be applied. 7 P.2d at 791–92. By showing that the
defendant was a Communist Party member, the state would hold him
responsible for “all of the strange doctrines and teachings that any member of
such organization ever advocated.” Id. at 791 (Belt, J., dissenting). He observed,
Applying the same logic, if some Democrat should go so far as to assert in
a public speech that all Republicans should be shot at sunrise, then every
member of the Democratic Party would be guilty of crime. The doctrine of
criminal conspiracy, when thus extended, leads to absurdity.
Id.
214. People v. Wright, 226 P. 952 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924).
215. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 402 (1957) (“[E]very
conspiracy is by its very nature secret.”).
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would be caught easily. Wright, however, subverted that model. In
that case, agents raided a house, on the front of which hung a sign
proclaiming, “I.W.W. Office.” An I.W.W. member who had not been
in the house when the raid commenced approached an officer,
delivering to him his I.W.W. membership card. 216 He was then
arrested. The usual career witnesses testified for the prosecution. 217
It was, in fact, at this trial that Coutts admitted to being an
arsonist. 218
People v. Johansen was another absurd case. 219 The defendants
had been arrested and convicted of syndicalism for being I.W.W.
members in Sacramento County. They resided in other counties, but
had been subpoenaed to testify at another I.W.W. trial, which was
taking place in Sacramento County. 220 They obeyed the subpoena,
appeared and testified, and then were arrested and indicted. 221 The
court affirmed their second conviction because their membership
was a conspiracy, and therefore an ongoing crime. 222 The court
noted that the defendants could have escaped criminal liability by
ending their association with the “unlawful organization” prior to
entering Sacramento County. 223

X.

WINDING DOWN THE RED SCARE

By the mid-1920s, state syndicalism and federal conspiracy
prosecutions began to wane because the anarchist threat never
materialized, 224 antisocialism laws were recognized as excessive
and led to false convictions, 225 and deportations of Wobblies were
deemed abusive, 226 because the I.W.W. never posed any threat 227
and rejected violence. 228 It was, in fact, authority entities that were
responsible for most of the violent incidents surrounding the Red

216. Wright, 226 P. at 953.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. People v. Johansen, 226 P. 634 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924).
220. Id. at 634.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 635.
223. Id. at 636.
224. Mohrenschildt, supra note 64, at 134.
225. Williams, supra note 141, at 571.
226. Braeman, supra note 55, at 107.
227. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 387 (1927) (holding that the
conviction of the defendant under the Syndicalism Act was a violation of the
defendant’s due process because his organization never advocated for crime,
violence, or unlawful acts); Colyer, 265 F. 17, at 63 (explaining it was Congress’s
intent to “expel aliens who advocate force and violence”); People v. Thornton,
219 P. 1020, 1022 (1923) (noting the attenuated nature of the evidence produced
by the prosecution in a criminal syndicalism trial).
228. Joseph R. Conlin, The IWW and the Question of Violence, 51 WISC. MAG.
HIST. 316, 323 (1968).
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Scare. 229 For example, the I.W.W.’s reputation for violence was
created by agents provocateurs, sometimes enlisted by employers to
discredit workers’ unions. 230
At the state level, in De Jonge v. Oregon, 231 the Supreme Court
reversed a syndicalism conviction based on the defendant’s
participation at an open Communist Party meeting. 232 The Court
recognized the problem of guilt by association, highlighting the
law’s poor track record of distinguishing between actual
conspiracies and “participation in . . . peaceable assembl[ies].” 233
At the federal level, perhaps the last Espionage Act case of its
kind was Dickson v. Young. 234 Dickson had been arrested during the
Palmer raids and charged with seven Espionage Act counts 235 for
not contributing enough to the Red Cross. 236 He was acquitted of six
of the charges, and an appellate court reversed the remaining
conviction. 237

XI. CONCLUSION
The period from 1918 to 1927 witnessed the widespread use of
membership crime, out of which substantive First Amendment
rights emerged. While robust speech rights would ultimately result,
assembly was most often at issue. The WWI-era history of
membership crime and the First Amendment, which this Article has
retrieved, justifies an invigorated assembly right, responds to
emerging scholarship on that right, 238 and is a corrective to
subsequent jurisprudence, which has discounted the right. 239
229. Michael Stohl, War and Domestic Political Violence: The Case of the
United States 1890–1970, 19 J. CON. RESOL. 379, 396 (1975).
230. Conlin, supra note 227, at 324.
231. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
232. Id. at 362.
233. Id. at 365.
234. Dickson v. Young, 221 N.W. 820 (Iowa 1928); Dickson v. Young, 210
N.W. 452 (Iowa 1926); Dickson v. Young, 200 N.W. 210 (Iowa 1924).
235. Dickson, 200 N.W. at 211.
236. Dickson, 221 N.W. at 821 (Dickson allegedly “was not doing his part in
the matter of contributions to the Red Cross and other war necessities and in
other respects.”).
237. Dickson, 200 N.W. at 211.
238. John D. Inazu has argued that “the freedom of assembly has been at
the heart of some of the most important social movements in American history.”
INAZU, supra note 5, at 1. Paul Horwitz rejects the primacy of “the lone
pamphleteer or soapbox speaker,” and argues that “the most important aspects
of the lived world of First Amendment activity take place through institutions.”
HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 8–9. Roscoe Pound viewed the speech right “not so
much as an individual right but as a social interest in individual expression.”
FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 41 (1982).
Frederick Schauer similarly observed that the “values underlying the
arguments from truth and democracy are more social than individual.” Id. at
60.
239. Inazu argues that the Supreme Court took wrong turns, first by
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recognizing an atextual freedom of association in 1958, and then applying
association jurisprudence to the detriment of the now-moribund right of
assembly. INAZU, supra note 5, at 1–2. Horwitz observes that the current speech
rights approach to the First Amendment “routinely exphasize[s] the individual
and deemphasize[s] the institutional.” This is a problem because institutions
are “places in which public discourse is formed and disseminated.” HORWITZ,
supra note 5, at 14, 27. Jason Mazzone is blunter, writing, “The assembly and
petition clause is today largely ignored in First Amendment analysis.” Jason
Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 646 (2002). This is
historically interesting because in the past, “the rights to assemble and petition
were . . . core political values (to which freedom of speech was often quite
secondary).” Id. at 646–47 (2002).
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